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Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) allow wireless
communications between vehicles without the aid of a central
server. Reliable exchanges of information about road and traffic
conditions allow a safer and more comfortable travelling en-
vironment. However, such profusion of information may allow
unscrupulous parties to violate user privacy. On the other hand,
a degree of auditability is desired for law enforcement and
maintenance purposes. In this paper we propose a Threshold
Anonymous Announcement service using direct anonymous attes-
tation and one-time anonymous authentication to simultaneously
achieve the seemingly contradictory goals of reliability, privacy
and auditability.
Index Terms—Vehicular communication, threshold verifica-
tion, reliability, privacy, auditability.
I. INTRODUCTION
VEHICULAR ad hoc networks (VANETs) allow wirelesscommunications between vehicles and roadside infras-
tructures. By using a VANET, a vehicle can broadcast a
piece of information to other vehicles without going through
a central server. Let us consider the following scenario:
Scenario 1.1: Suppose that a car driver Bob receives a
message from another vehicle reporting some traffic jam a few
miles away. He has no idea whether the message is true or
false. He attempts to ignore it. But shortly after that he receives
several (say n) messages reporting the same traffic jam. If n is
a reasonably large number and these n messages are sent by n
different vehicles, then it is likely that this information is true,
because it seems unlikely that any n vehicles would collude
to lie. However, all these messages are sent anonymously,
since nobody wants to disclose their identities. How can Bob
find out whether n received messages are sent by n different
legitimate vehicles without discovering the identities of these
vehicles?
In order to resolve Bob’s problem (illustrated in Figure 1),
here we propose a novel solution, called “Threshold Anony-
mous Announcement (TAA)” service.
Clearly, exchanges of information about road and traf-
fic conditions, if reliable, would enable a safer and more
conducive travelling environment. On the other hand, such
profusion of information may allow unscrupulous parties to
track vehicles for profiling or more invidious purposes. The
protection of user privacy is thus a matter of great importance.
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Fig. 1. A scenario of the TAA service.
However, it may also be desirable that rogue or malfunctioning
vehicles can be identified for repair or for law enforcement
purposes. There are thus seemingly contradictory requirements
of privacy and auditability. Our aim is to create a TAA solution
which satisfies the following three features simultaneously:
1) Reliability: If a vehicle accepts a reported event,
the announcement was issued by a legitimate and
present source (entity authentication) without unautho-
rized modification (data integrity). Furthermore, with
a high probability, the event has actually happened
(message truthfulness), and the service must also be
able to tolerate a small fraction of internal adversaries
(system robustness).
2) Privacy: A broadcast message cannot be bound to its
source (anonymity), and different messages from one
source cannot be linked to each other (unlinkability),
conditional upon the source behaving properly.
3) Auditability: If the source is defective or malicious, it
can be identified and rejected (revocation). A source
cannot deny having sent a message (non-repudiation),
and all transactions of a misbehaving source can be
collated and tied to the source (traceability).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first intro-
duce related and prior work in this research topic in Section II,
which will emphasize the motivation of this work. We then
describe an overview of our contributions in Section III, and
the proposed TAA scheme in details in Section IV. Then,
we give an example to illustrate how the scheme can be
used in Section V, analyse the security of our TAA scheme
in Section VI, and present a comparison of performance
between this scheme and a number of the existing schemes in
Section VII. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
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II. RELATED AND PRIOR WORK
Many schemes have been proposed to address the issues of
reliability, privacy and auditability with a variety of mecha-
nisms, with differing emphasis and with varying degrees of
success. Here we will focus only on research that are particu-
larly relevant to providing reliability, privacy and auditability
within a smiliar framework, and discuss the issues that arise.
We refer the reader to the papers of Papadimitratos et al.
([17]) and Kounga et al. ([14]) for their excellent surveys and
overviews on the wider topic.
The use of a threshold method to acheive reliability is a
common approach in the literature ([11], [13], [14], [19]).
Normally vehicles communicating with each other do not have
a strong trust relation. In order to achieve some assurance that
an announcement of a traffic event is true, the receiver only
accepts a message which has been confirmed by a threshold
number of vehicles. This threshold may be fixed system-wide
([11], [19]), or user-controlled ([13], [14]). It must be selected
carefully, since too high a threshold may result in a vehicle not
being able to collect a sufficient number of endorsements and
therefore not being able to utilise the information, while too
low a threshold would allow a small number of adversaries
present to influence the decision. Various voting methods
([16]) may be adopted for decision-making by a verifier
receiving many, possibly conflicting, messages.
Associated with the reliability of an announcement are the
questions of integrity of the announcement and the authenticity
of the announcer. These properties are often achieved by using
a trusted third party (TTP) such as a certification authority
(CA), who distributes credentials (public key certificates in
most cases) to legitimate vehicles. These credentials are used
to somehow sign an announcement ([8], [11], [14], [15], [17],
[19]), which guarantees authentication and data integrity. In
addition, timestamps can be used to assure freshness.
Another issue that arises from adopting a threshold method
is the issue of distinguishability of origin: are two messages
purporting to be from different sources indeed from different
sources? If a single vehicle is able to send multiple mes-
sages pretending to come from different sources (the Sybil
attack of [12]), then it could influence the acceptance of
announcements, especially if the threshold is set low. In many
publications (such as [11], [14], [17], [19]), digital signatures
attached to announcements allow a receiver to check that they
are from different vehicles. Such a method, if used naively,
would compromise user privacy and allow linking of user
activities. On the other hand, schemes achieving anonymity
(such as [8], [15], using group signatures) tend to have
difficulty allowing distinguishing of sources without the use
of an online group manager.
User privacy generally includes two aspects, anonymity
and unlinkability. The property of unlinkability prevents user
tracking and profiling. A common mechanism used to provide
this is the regular updating of a vehicle’s credentials ([8], [14],
[15], [17]). However, this does not altogether solve the prob-
lem. A vehicle may still be tracked within the validity period
of a credential. A long validity period allows an adversary
to gather substantial information, while a short one allows
a rogue vehicle to send multiple messages without being
detected. Moreover, the efficiency of updating credentials is
also a concern.
Most schemes allow a CA or a group manager to re-
veal a signer’s identity and hence allow linking in some
circumstances. Otherwise, complete unlinkability may mean
that there is no possibility for auditing and revocation. It is
not clear that such a proposal would be acceptable to law
enforcement authorities. Interestingly, in [18], it is said that
US carmakers favour anonymity over liability.
Anonymity of vehicles can be provided by using
pseudonyms which do not indicate their owners’ identities.
These pseudonyms may be individual signing keys ([11], [17],
[14], although part of [14] has been shown to be insecure
([9])), or they may be group signing keys ([8], [15]), the
group being all vehicles registered with the CA. Since the
schemes based on group signatures are of the most interest to
us in this work, we will examine further the schemes proposed
in [8] and [15]. In both solutions, each vehicle is given an
individual membership signing key and the group public key.
The main difference is that in [15], a group signature (based
on [3]) is used to sign an announcement directly, while in [8],
a vehicle will instead generate a set of pseudonyms (public
keys) and use its group membership signing key (based on [4])
to sign each of the pseudonyms. These new pseudonyms and
associated secret keys are then used to sign announcements.
Both solutions achieve anonymity within a group and only the
group manager can reveal the signer’s identity.
However, two main issues are not addressed in these two
solutions: that of non-repudiation, and that of distinguishabil-
ity of origin. In both solutions, the group signature schemes
let the issuer create the private keys of group members. Thus
the schemes cannot provide non-repudiation, since the signer
is not the sole holder of the signing key. Group signature
schemes intrinsically do not provide distinguishability of
origin. Even though two signatures signed under the same
short-term key is linkable in [8], a malicious user may still
abuse the scheme by generating multiple such short-term keys
simultaneously in order to pretend to be multiple vehicles. As
a result, it is a challenge to achieve threshold verification of
anonymous signatures. While the group manager is able to
reveal the identities of the message senders in a dispute, it is
most likely off-line in the normal run of events, and honest
verifiers may not notice such a system abuse.
Our main goal is to provide a new TAA scheme which will
provide distinguishability of origin without the intervention of
any third party, and signer non-repudiation. Distinguishability
of origin is a prerequisite for flexible threshold verification,
by which we mean that each verifier can set up their own
thresholds and make their own judgement case by case. Our
TAA solution will achieve all the goals of reliability, privacy
and auditability simultaneously.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE TAA SOLUTION
A. Context
We focus on the environment of vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munication and will not assume the availability of roadside
infrastructure. We assume that a vehicle is equipped with
a tamper-resistant black box. This is a common approach
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in VANET protocol design ([14], [17]). This black box has
protected secure storage for secrets and a component which
can perform cryptographic operations securely, as well as
a secure time base. We assume that it will always operate
correctly according to protocol, and will never disclose its
secrets, even when its inputs are controlled by an adversary.
Associated with each black box is an individual cryptographic
key and its credential. This credential is a form of membership
certificate, and differs from an ordinary public key certificate
in that it is not made available to a signature verifier. It is used
to testify that the black box is indeed in possession of the
secret key and has been accredited by the system. It is created
under a system secret key owned by a system issuer, and the
corresponding system public key is available to all vehicles.
Each announcement is generated by using the vehicle’s key
and credential and is verified by using the system public key.
The black box may also be preloaded with certain infor-
mation (such as the issuer’s public key), some of which may
be downloaded to or updated by a trusted party at intervals.
Trusted parties may be national transport authorities and
vehicle manufacturers. This situation of having relatively few
centralised authorities lend itself to public key infrastructures
(see [21] for an overview and further references). Hence public
keys and other public parameters may be securely distributed
at manufacture or when vehicles are registered. Interactions
between vehicles and trusted parties may be required at inter-
vals for updating of public keys and credentials for revocation
purposes or for tracing purposes. These may also be performed
at maintenance time, or at designated service points. In the
normal run of events the trusted parties would be offline.
B. Adversaries
In our paper we will adhere to the model in which ad-
versaries constitute a relatively small fraction of the active
vehicles at any one time ([13], [17]). They may be internal -
essentially they may have in their possession some legitimate
black boxes. However, while they may make vehicles and
black boxes form and broadcast any messages they choose,
the black boxes will always perform their internal operations
correctly. For example, an adversary may input an invalid mes-
sage to the black box, and the black box will generate random
numbers and perform other necessary operations correctly and
return a correct signature on that invalid message. The aim of
an adversary would be to make announcements that would be
accepted by other vehicles and thereby mislead them, or to
track other vehicles.
We will also assume that the authorities or any part of the
VANET infrastructure apart from the vehicles are “honest-but-
curious”, that is, they are passive and would eavesdrop and
gather information but would not launch any active attacks.
They would also execute all protocols correctly. The privacy
of a well-behaved user should also be protected against these
parties, in the sense that its legitimate activities should not be
traceable by them.
C. Our solution
Based on techniques used in direct anonymous attestation
(DAA) ([10]) and k-time anonymous authentication ([22]),
we propose a new solution to address the issues of non-
repudiation and distinguishability of origin in the context of
user privacy.
The original DAA scheme ([5]) was adopted in 2003 by the
Trusted Computing Group ([23]) as a mechanism for a user
to anonymously convince a verifier that the user’s computer
platform is accredited by a trusted authority. Recently a
number of more efficient DAA schemes based on bilinear
maps have been proposed (for example, [6], [7], [10]).
DAA schemes can also be seen as group signature schemes
without the functionality of tracing a signature back to its
signer, and signer privacy is thus enhanced. The property of
non-repudiation is achieved since a user’s secret key is not
disclosed to any authority. In addition, DAA schemes allow
user-controlled linkability of signatures. We make use of this
feature to provide distinguishability of origin by allowing the
linking of signatures if a signer signs a message with the same
content twice.
A k-time anonymous signature scheme (such as [22]) allows
a signer’s identity to be revealed if the signer signs the same
message more than k times. For the purpose of the TAA
solution, we need an anonymous signature scheme which can
optionally achieve one of the two properties: when a signer
signs the same message twice, either the two signatures are
linked while the signer remains anonymous, or the signer’s
identity is revealed. We will adapt the k-time anonymous
authentication scheme of [22] to be used in conjunction with
the DAA scheme of [10] to create our TAA scheme. We keep
these two optional properties as two separate versions in the
TAA scheme. Other issues arising in the use of anonymous
signature schemes are those of revocation and auditability. The
DAA scheme of [10] allows for an efficient revocation scheme,
which we will describe in Section IV-I.
We note that neither the direct anonymous attestation
scheme of [10] nor the one-time anonymous signature scheme
of [22] would satisfy all the goals of a TAA service on its
own. In the next section we will present an adaptation and
amalgamation of both schemes, consolidated by the addition
of three new algorithms, to provide a comprehensive service
that achieves all the desired goals of reliability, privacy and
auditability.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE TAA SCHEME
We now give a detailed description of our new TAA
scheme. The TAA scheme includes the Setup, Sign, Verify,
ThresholdCheck, Link and Trace algorithms and the Join and
Disavow protocols, where Setup creates system parameters
and long-term keys, the Join protocol allows each legiti-
mate user to get its credential, Sign/Verify signs a mes-
sage anonymously and verifies such an anonymous signature,
ThresholdCheck checks whether a message has been signed
by a certain number of independent users, Link shows whether
two anonymous signatures on the same message are from the
same signer, Trace finds the true signer if this signer has
signed the same message twice, and the Disavow protocol is
used to prove whether a signer and a signature are crypto-
graphically bound if such a signer is required to do so (for
instance, in the setting of law enforcement). These algorithms
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and protocols will be described in the following subsections
separately.
In the specification of these protocols and algorithms, we
will use standard notation as follows. If S is any set then we
denote the action of sampling an element from S uniformly
at random and assigning the result to the variable x as x←S.
If A is any algorithm then we denote the action of obtaining
x by running A on inputs y1, . . . , yn as x ← A(y1, . . . , yn).
We denote the concatenation of two strings x and y as x‖y,
and scalar multiplication of an integer a and a group element
P as a · P , while multiplication of two integers a and b is
denoted ab. We write {0, 1}t for the set of binary strings of
length t and {0, 1}∗ for the set of binary strings of arbitrary
length.
The entities in the TAA scheme are called the players. There
are three sets of players in our scheme: the set I of issuers,
the set S of signers and the set V of verifiers. In our case
the set S of signers coincides with the set V of verifiers and
both are vehicles, while the set I of issuers is part of the
trusted authorities (such as vehicle manufacturers and transport
authorities).
A. The setup algorithm
To set the system up we need to select public parameters for
all protocols and algorithms within the TAA scheme as well
as the long term parameters for each issuer. As described in
Section III-A, each signer/verifier is equipped with a tamper-
resistant black box, which is a TPM-type device. (A TPM
(Trusted Platform Module) is a tamper-resistant cryptographic
chip as specified in [23].) We assume that prior to any system
setup each black box has its private endorsement key SK
embedded into it and that each issuer has access to the
corresponding public endorsement key PK. We also assume a
secure public key signature scheme has been selected for use
with these keys, with signing algorithm sigSK and verification
algorithm verPK. In addition, each black box would also
generate an internal secret TAAseed specific to itself. This
value would be stored securely within the black box and would
never be disclosed or changed, as the black box is assumed
to be tamper-resistant.
On input of an integer t (note that the size of this value is
dependent on the security strength of the scheme), the setup
algorithm executes the following:
1) At first, three cyclic groups, G1,G2 and GT , of suffi-
ciently large prime order q (q ≈ 2t) are selected. Two
random generators are selected such that G1 = 〈P1〉 and
G2 = 〈P2〉 along with a pairing tˆ : G1×G2 → GT . We
write G1, G2 additively and GT multiplicatively. The
pairing tˆ is a map from G1 ×G2 to GT such that
(i) tˆ is bilinear, that is, tˆ(a · P1, b ·P2) = tˆ(P1, P2)ab
for any two integers a and b ∈ Zq .
(ii) tˆ is non-degenerate, that is, tˆ(P1, P2) 
= 1GT ,
where 1GT is the identity element of GT .
(iii) tˆ is computable, that is, there is a polynomial time
algorithm for computing tˆ(P,Q) for any P ∈ G1
and Q ∈ G2.
Note that the groups are selected so that solving the
decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem in G1, the
Gap Discrete Logarithm (Gap-DL) problem in G1 and
G2 and the blind bilinear LRSW problem are hard. We
shall give an informal description of these computational
assumptions in Section VI.
2) Secondly, six hash functions are selected: H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → Zq and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq , H3 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq , H5 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and
H6 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq . Note that the hash-functions H5
and H6 are used to achieve the property of one-time
anonymity. Note also that in implementation, the same
hash function can be used for H1, H2, H4 and H6, and
similarly for H3 and H5
3) Thirdly, for each issuer i ∈ I the following is performed.
Two integers are selected x, y←Zq and the issuer secret
key isk is assigned to be (x, y). Then the values X =
x · P2 ∈ G2 and Y = y · P2 ∈ G2 are computed. The
issuer public key ipk is assigned to be (X,Y ).
4) Finally, the system public parameters par are set to
be (G1,G2,GT , tˆ, P1, P2, q,H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6,
ipkk) and are published.
B. The join protocol
This is a protocol between a given signer s ∈ S and an
issuer i ∈ I. This protocol is identical to the Join protocol of
the DAA scheme ([10]), except that we do not spilt the signer
role between the TPM and computer platform, since in our
application each vehicle has a simple computing device instead
of a comprehensive computer. Intuitively, the Join protocol
(shown in Figure 2) proceeds as follows. First a signer s
generates a secret value f using its internal seed TAAseed,
along with the value KI provided by i and a count number
cnt. We note that a signer could compute many values of
f , one for each data string of “cnt‖KI”1. The signer s then
computes a commitment comm on the value f and sends
comm to the issuer i. The value comm essentially binds the
signer’s secret value f , the signer’s long-term endorsement
key SK and the issuer’s nonce nI all together. Upon receipt
of comm, the issuer i performs some checks on it, including
a comparison to the rogue list, which consists of the values
of all exposed fs for those already compromised vehicles. If
it verifies correctly, the issuer i is sure that the signer has
prepared the commitment comm correctly and thus computes
a credential cre = (A,B,C) and sends it back to the signer
s, who then verifies the correctness of cre by performing a
few pairing evaluations. Hereafter, the issuer can use its valid
credential cre to sign any message anonymously.
C. The signing algorithm
This is an algorithm run by a signer s ∈ S to produce
a signature on some message. Specifically, the signature
should prove the knowledge of a discrete logarithm f and
the knowledge of a valid credential cre corresponding to the
value f without revealing either value.
Let msgt and msgb denote the title and main body, respec-
tively, of the message to be signed. The title is specific to an
1This creates the possibility that a vehicle may use a different value of f
for different types of announcements.
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Signer (s) Issuer (i)
nI←{0, 1}∗
str←X‖Y ‖nI commreqﬀ commreq←nI
f←H1(TAAseed‖cnt‖KI)
u←Zq; U←u · P1;F←f · P1
v←H2(str‖F‖U)
w←u+ vf (mod q)
γ←sigSK(F ||v||w)
comm←(F, v, w, γ) comm, nI If nI ∈ {commreq} then abort
If verPK(γ, (F ||v||w)) = false then abort
U ′←w · P1 − v · F ; str←X‖Y ‖nI
If F = fi · P1 for any fi on the rogue list, or
v = H2(str‖F‖U ′) then abort
r←Zq; A←r · P1;B←y · A
If tˆ(A, Y ) = tˆ(B,P2) creﬀ C←(x · A+ rxy · F ); cre←(A,B,C)
or tˆ(A+ f · B,X) = tˆ(C,P2)
then abort
Fig. 2. The Join Protocol
Signer (s)
Input: f ∈ Zq ; nT←{0, 1}∗; msg = (msgt,msgb),
msgt ∈ {0, 1}∗ , msgb ∈ {0, 1}∗
a←Zq ; z←Zq
J←H3(msgt); K = f · J ; L←z · J
R←a · A;S←a · B; T←a · C; τ←tˆ(S,X)z
Version 2 only: M←H5(msgt) +H6(nT ‖msgb‖L‖R‖S‖T ) · P1;
N = f ·M ; O←z ·M
Version 1: c←H4(R‖S‖T‖τ‖J‖K‖L‖nT ‖msgb)
Version 2: c←H4(τ‖J‖K‖M‖N‖O‖nT ‖msgb)
s←z + c · f (mod q)
Version 1: σ←(R,S, T, J,K, c, s, nT )
Version 2: σ←(R,S, T, J,K,M,N, c, s, nT )
Output: σ
Fig. 3. The Sign Algorithm
event and the main body is an arbitrary data string. Let nT
denote a data string which contributes a verifiable randomness
to the signature. It could be a time stamp, a series number or
a random number.
The algorithm proceeds as in Figure 3. This algorithm is
a modification of the Sign algorithm of [10]. Intuitively, the
signer first randomizes his original credential cre = (A,B,C)
to get a temporary but also valid credential cre′ = (R,S, T ).
Then, by using the knowledge of f the signer can show
that both cre′ = (R,S, T ) and the pair (J,K) correspond
to the same secret f without revealing the value of f itself
- a non-interactive zero knowledge proof ([21]). Given two
(temporary) credentials, it is impossible to determine whether
they are produced by the same signer, or to identify the signer.
Consequently, anonymity is achieved (see more discussion in
Section VI).
For the purposes of our TAA service, we specify two
versions of the signing algorithm. In the first version the
arbitrary basename of the DAA scheme is replaced by the
meaningful event title msgt, and the algorithm follows the
principle privacy property of DAA: unless the private key f is
revealed or compromised, signer anonymity holds regardless
of the signer’s behaviour. If the signer signs a single event (that
is, a single msgt value) more than once, these signatures can
be linked to each other, since they will contain the same values
of a base point J and its point multiplication K . However
the signer’s identity will still be hidden from the verifier or
the issuer or both of them colluded. In the second version,
we add a novel “misbehaviour traceability” property, which
is not offered in [10], [22] or, to our best knowledge, any
other existing work. That is, if a signer produces more than
one distinct signatures on a single event, not only can these
signatures be linked, but also the identity of the signer (i.e. the
value F = f · P1) can be calculated from the signatures. The
detailed procedure of tracing will be specified in the algorithm
Trace.
D. The verification algorithm
This is an algorithm run by a verifier v ∈ V to check that
a given signature σ does prove the knowledge of a discrete
logarithm f as well as the knowledge of a valid credential
issued on the same value of f , and that this value of f is not
on the list of rogue values. The algorithm proceeds as in Figure
4. To follow the two versions of the Sign algorithm, we also
specify the corresponding two versions in the Verify algorithm.
This algorithm is modified from the Verify algorithm of [10] to
reflect the modifications and extensions in the Sign algorithm
that we have made.
E. The threshold checking algorithm
This algorithm, run by a given verifier v ∈ V , is newly
developed for our TAA solution and it brings us a unique
property of light-weight and flexible threshold verification.
Each verifier maintains a list B of l events and associated
information, B = {Bi}li=1. The information associated with
an event Bi includes the event description eventi, an expiry
time expi, and a collection of ki signed announcements of the
event (σji ,msg
j
i ), 1 ≤ j ≤ ki. There may also be a threshold
ti associated with Bi, or ti may be a constant across all Bi’s.
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Verifier (v)
Input: ipkk = (X, Y ); msg = (msgt,msgb)
Version 1: σ = (R, S, T, J,K, c, s, nT )
Version 2: σ = (R, S, T, J,K,M,N, c, s, nT )
If K = fi · J , for any fi in the set of rogue secret keys, or
tˆ(R, Y ) = tˆ(S, P2), or
J = H3(msgt) return reject
ρ†a←tˆ(R,X); ρ†b←tˆ(S,X); ρ†c←tˆ(T, P2)
τ†←(ρ†b)s · (ρ†c/ρ†a)−c
L†←s · J − c ·K
Version 2 only: If M = H5(msgt) +H6(nT ‖msgb‖L†‖R‖S‖T ) · P1
return reject
Version 2 only: O†←s ·M − c ·N
Version 1: If c = H4(R‖S‖T‖τ†‖J‖K‖L†‖nT ‖msgb) return reject
Version 2: If c = H4(τ†‖J‖K‖M‖N‖O†‖nT ‖msgb) return reject
Otherwise return accept
Fig. 4. The Verify Algorithm
We assume that an external program periodically examines the
list and deletes Bi when it expires.
When a signed announcement (σ,msg) is received, the
verifier checks that the signature is valid, and then checks
the signed event against the list B. If the event announced has
not been reported before, then a new event Bl+1 is created
and appended to B, as long as memory capacity cap has not
been exceeded. Otherwise the message is simply dropped. If
there is already an entry Bi for the announced event, then
the signature is checked against the list of signatures already
received to ensure it is not a duplicate message signed by
some signer again. If it is, it can be logged and rejected. If it
is not, it is added to the list.
When the number of signed announcements reporting this
event reaches the threshold ti, action is taken. The action
procedure is an external procedure which may be log, endorse,
respond, trace or remove: log denotes the recording of a
signed announcement, endorse denotes the generating of a
signed announcement on the relevant event, respond denotes
the taking of appropriate actions in response to the event, trace
denotes invoking the Trace algorithm, and remove denotes the
removal of a Bi either because it has expired, or because action
has been taken. We will use action(log, endorse, . . .) to denote
the actions that the program might take at various points of
the threshold checking process. More details of this procedure
can be considered in implementations. The algorithm proceeds
as in Figure 5.
F. The linking algorithm
This algorithm, run by a given verifier v ∈ V , is identical
to the Link algorithm of [10]. Given a pair of signatures for
the same event (i.e. with the same value of msgt), the verifier
executes the Link algorithm (illustrated in Figure 6) to check
if the pair of signatures were produced by the same signer.
G. The tracing algorithm
This algorithm, run by a given verifier v ∈ V , is newly
developed for our TAA solution. It is only applicable if Version
2 of the Sign algorithm was used, as Version 1 is not designed
Verifier (v)
Input: (σ,msg), B = {Bi}li=1
σ = (R,S, T, J, K, (M,N), c, s, nT ), msg = (msgt,msgb)
Bi = (eventi, expi, ti, {σji = (. . .Kji . . .),msgji}
ki
j=1)
If reject ← Verify(σ,msg) return reject
For i = 1 to l
{If eventi = msgt then
For j = 1 to ki
{ If σ = σji return reject
If K = Kji then action(log, trace); return reject
}
If ki = ti − 1 then
action(respond, log, endorse, remove); return accept
ki←ki + 1; (σkii ,msg
ki
i ) ← (σ,msg);
action(endorse); return accept
}
If l < cap
Bl+1←(msgt, expl+1, tl+1, {σ,msg}); B←B ∪ {Bl+1}; l←l+ 1
action(endorse); return accept
return reject
Fig. 5. The ThresholdCheck Algorithm
Verifier (v)
Input: (σb,msgb), msgb = (msgtb,msgbb), b = 0, 1
If msgt0 = msgt1 return ⊥
If reject← Verify(σb,msgb) for any b ∈ {0, 1} return ⊥
If J0 = J1 and K0 = K1 return linked
Otherwise return unlinked
Fig. 6. The Link Algorithm
to support tracing. Intuitively, given a pair of signatures with
the same value of msgt, the verifier checks if the pair of
signatures were produced by the same signer. If yes, the
verifier computes the identity of the signer, written as (F, f),
from the two signatures. The algorithm proceeds as in Figure
7. Note that the value F is sufficient to identify the signer and
that if f 
=⊥, this value will be put in the rogue list.
H. The disavowing protocol
This protocol, run between a given signer s ∈ S and
a verifier v ∈ V , is also newly developed for our TAA
solution and it brings us the property of non-repudiation. In-
tuitively, given a signature σ signed on msg = (msgt,msgb),
where accept←Verify(σ,msg) holds, this protocol determines
whether the signer s is the signer of σ or not. The ver-
ifier v creates a nonce n′T and sends it to the signer s
as a challenge, and s responds with a signature σ′ signed
on (msg, n′T ). If reject←Verify(σ′,msg), v concludes that
s is attempting to disavow. If accept←Verify(σ′,msg) and
unlinked←Link(σ, σ′), v concludes that s is not the signer
of σ. If accept←Verify(σ,msg) and linked←Link(σ, σ′), v
concludes that s is the signer of σ. If the second version of
the Sign algorithm is used, v can further retrieve the signer’s
identity by running the Trace algorithm instead of the Link
algorithm, to obtain F←Trace(σ, σ′). Our protocol proceeds
as shown in Figure 8.
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Verifier (v)
Input: (σb,msgb), msgb = (msgtb,msgbb), b = 0, 1
σb = (Rb, Sb, Tb, Jb,Kb,Mb, Nb, cb, sb, (nT )b),
If msgt0 = msgt1 return ⊥
If reject← Verify(σb,msgb) for any b ∈ {0, 1} return ⊥
If K0 = K1 return unlinked
L†b←sb · Jb − cb ·Kb
h0←H6((nT )0‖msgb0‖L†0‖R0‖S0‖T0)
h1←H6((nT )1‖msgb1‖L†1‖R1‖S1‖T1)
If h0 = h1 returns ⊥ (i.e., (σ0,msg0) and (σ1,msg1) are the same)
If L†0 = L
†
1 and s0 = s1 , f←(s0 − s1)/(c0 − c1); otherwise f← ⊥
F←(N0 −N1)/(h0 − h1)
Output (F, f)
Fig. 7. The Trace Algorithm
I. A note on revocation
In our TAA scheme, as in any system supporting revocation
lists, the longer the rogue list is, the worse the practical
efficiency of the Verify algorithm will be. To avoid the
situation where the revocation list becomes too large, we
should consider the permanent revocation of the revealed or
compromised credentials. A simple scheme for revocation by
updating issuers’ keys and signers’ credentials is described in
[10]. We give a brief description here. The issuer i has private
key isk = (x, y) and public key ipk = (X = x·P2, Y = y·P2).
The signer s has secret f with commitment value F = f ·P1.
Its corresponding credential issued by i is cre = (A =
r · P1, B = y · A,C = x · A + rxy · F ). During the Join
Protocol, the issuer would typically store F together with the
credential cre, or at least C, the last part of cre. To update its
keys, the issuer i first updates its secret key x to a new value
x˙. Let β = x˙/x. The issuer then updates its public key by
replacing X by X˙ = β ·X . Now, for each currently legitimate
signer s with credential cre = (A,B,C), i replaces C with
C˙ = β ·C. The issuer then publishes its new public key (X˙, Y )
and makes C˙ available to s. The signers to be revoked will
not have their credentials updated and hence their signatures
will not verify correctly under the new public key (X˙, Y ).
V. EXAMPLE
We give an example of how the various components of our
TAA scheme can be used to resolve Bob’s problem in Scenario
1.1. For simplicity, here we only use Version 1 of our TAA
scheme. Suppose Bob, driving along in his car, receives a
message (msg0, σ0), where
msg0 = (msgt0 = traﬃc jamLocTimeDate,msgb0 =⊥),
σ0 = (R0, S0, T0, J0,K0, c0, s0, (nT )0).
Bob realises that a vehicle is reporting a traffic jam at
location Loc, time Time and date Date. He (or rather,
the black box BBB associated with his vehicle) uses the
ThresholdCheck algorithm to process the message. Firstly Bob
verifies that the signature is valid using the Verify algorithm. If
it is not valid Bob rejects the announcement. If it is valid Bob
checks whether there have already been signed announcements
reporting the traffic jam. If it has not been reported, then
a new list can be created for it. If there have already been
announcements, Bob checks for duplicates by running the
Link algorithm. If it transpires that the vehicle that made this
announcement has already reported the event msgt0 before,
then there would be another signature σ′0 recorded that would
contain K ′0 = f0 · J ′0 where J ′0 = H3(msgt0) = J0. Hence
K ′0 = K0, and the ThresholdCheck algorithm would log and
reject this announcement.
If this announcement is legitimate, Bob waits to see if there
are more reports on this event. Subsequently he receives n
more messages (msgi, σi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
msgi = (msgt0,msgbi), σi = (Ri, Si, Ti, Ji,Ki, ci, si, (nT )i).
As Bob receives each message, he uses the ThresholdCheck
algorithm to process the message as described above. If the
number of announcements of the event reaches the predeter-
mined threshold, Bob believes that the reported event is true
and takes appropriate action, such as avoiding the route with
the traffic jam. If the threshold is not reached, the announce-
ments are added to the list. In either case Bob may wish to
add his own endorsement of the event msgt0. To do this, his
black box BBB would form msgB = (msgt0,msgbB), where
msgbB may consist of all the previous announcements he had
received, or it may be left blank. A signature σB will then be
generated using the Sign algorithm and (msgB, σB) will be
broadcast.
If the reported traffic jam is not true then it is unlikely
that there will be sufficient number of vehicles endorsing the
event to reach the threshold. The list containing the false
announcement would very likely remain below threshold until
it is removed at expiry time. Bob continues with his journey
without taking any action.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we informally show that our TAA scheme
satisfies the three security requirements of reliability, privacy,
and auditability as described in Section I. Before starting
to present the security analysis, we first give an informal
description of the computational assumptions on which the
security of the TAA scheme is based. For formal definitions
and further details we refer the readers to [10].
The blind bilinear LRSW assumption is described as
follows. Let G1 = 〈P1〉, G2 = 〈P2〉 and GT be cyclic groups
of a prime order q, and let tˆ : G1 × G2 → GT be a pairing.
Let X = x · P2, Y = y · P2 for some random x, y ∈ Zq .
Suppose there is an oracle (i.e. a helping algorithm) that, on
input F ∈ G1, outputs a triple (A, y ·A, x ·A+rxy ·F ) where
A = r ·P1 for some random r ∈ Zq . Then there is no efficient
algorithm that queries the oracle a polynomial number of times
and outputs (f,A,B,C) such that F = f · P1, A ∈ G1,
B = y · A, C = x · A + fxy · A, where F = f · P1 has not
been queried before.
The decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption in the
group G1 = 〈P1〉 is as follows. For any polynomial algorithm,
it is hard to tell a triple (X = x ·P1, Y = y ·P1, Z = z ·P1) ∈
G31 from a triple (X = x ·P1, Y = y ·P1, Z = xy ·P1) ∈ G31,
where x, y, z ∈ Zq are all unknown random numbers. Namely,
xy ·P1 looks like a random element in G1, given x ·P1, y ·P1
and the related pairing tˆ from G1×G2 to GT . More accurately,




σ′←Signf (msg, n′T ) disareqﬀ disareq←(n′T ,msg)
disa←(σ′,msg, n′T ) disa If n′T ,msg ∈ {disareq} or
If reject←Verify(σ′,msg) return disavowed
Version 1:
If unlinked←Link(σ, σ′) return unlinked
Otherwise return linked
Version 2:
If unlinked←Trace(σ, σ′) return unlinked
Otherwise return F←Trace(σ, σ′)
Fig. 8. The Disavow Protocol
this is called the external Diffie-Hellman assumption ([10]).
Note that we are working in asymmetric pairing setting (i.e.,
G1 
= G2), while in a symmetric pairing the DDH assumption
does not hold any more.
The Gap-DL assumption in a group G1 = 〈P1〉 is as
follows. Let X = x · P1 for some unknown x ∈ Zq and tˆ
the related pairing from G1 ×G2 to GT . Suppose there is an
oracle (a helping algorithm) that, on input Y ∈ G, will return
x·Y . Given the valueX , there is no polynomial algorithm that
computes x after querying the oracle a polynomial number of
times.
Intuitively, the blind bilinear LRSW assumption implies
that any polynomial attacker, who can corrupt and control a
polynomial number of credentials held by the corresponding
vehicles, cannot forge a new credential (f,A,B,C) by itself
without the issuer’s help. This essentially means that the Join
protocol is secure, i.e., only a registered vehicle is able to get
its valid credential cre with respect to one secret signing key
f from the issuer. The Sign algorithm gives a non-interactive
zero knowledge proof ([21]) showing that the signer knows
the secret f corresponding to a valid (and unforgeable) but
shuffled credential (R,S, T ). In other words, this implies
that the Sign algorithm is secure, that is, without holding
a valid credential nobody can produce a valid anonymous
signature for any message. Together they provide both entity
authentication and data integrity, as only legitimate vehicle
can generate a valid (anonymous) signature and such a signed
message cannot be forged or modified without being detected.
Moreover, if a vehicle signs a message with the same con-
tent (msgt) multiple times, all those signatures can be linked
since they include the same pair (J,K), (as J = H3(msgt),
K = f · J). (This is also the rationale behind the Link
algorithm.) Hence our TAA scheme provides distinguishability
of origin, which enables the ThresholdCheck algorithm to
correctly determine the number of vehicles announcing a
particular event. If an event is not true, these announcements
will not result in any action, since we assume that the number
of malicious vehicles is relatively few. Consequently threshold
verification is supported in our TAA scheme. This also means
that our scheme can provide a high level of message truth-
fulness and a certain level of system robustness against active
adversaries. Hence our TAA scheme satisfies the requirement
of reliability.
The essence of the Sign algorithm is to shuffle the original
credential (A,B,C) to a temporary one (R,S, T ) in such a
way that it is infeasible to link a shuffled credential to the
original one, or to link two shuffled credentials. This is due to
the following unique feature in the asymmetric pairing setting:
there is no isomorphism between G1 and G2 (more details
in [10]). The temporary credentials do not contain any useful
information that can be used to link two signatures or indicate
their owners’ identities, so this justifies why anonymity is
provided in the TAA scheme. As long as a vehicle behaves
correctly and does not sign a message with the same content
more than once, its signatures will be unlinkable by all parties,
since under the DDH assumption, it is infeasible to decide
whether two pairs (J,K) and (J ′,K ′) are generated using the
same secret f or not. Therefore, unlike the existing schemes
based on group signatures [8], [15], our scheme protects the
privacy of a well-behaved vehicle against active adversaries
as well as “honest-but-curious” authorities. Hence our TAA
scheme satisfies the privacy requirement.
Finally, we consider the requirement of auditability. Revoca-
tion is supported in our TAA scheme by publishing the rogue
list, which contains the secret f of all compromised vehicles.
To prevent previously legal but currently illegal users from
generating valid message announcements, revocation can also
be performed by updating issuers’ keys and legitimate signers’
credentials, as described in Section IV-I. Non-repudiation is
achieved by virtue of the Disavow protocol since a vehicle’s
secret signing key is known only to itself. Traceability is
provided by version 2 of the Sign algorithm. Using the Trace
algorithm (for version 2), a misbehaving vehicle signing the
same message multiple times can be traced and its identity (the
value F ) revealed. Hence our TAA scheme allows a reasonable
amount of auditability while protecting honest users’ privacy.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Table I summarizes the performance of our TAA scheme.
We consider only the three most expensive operations: scalar
multiplications in G1, exponentiation in GT , and pairing eval-
uations, since the overheads of hash evaluations and arithmetic
operations in Zq are very small compared to these expensive
operations. As observed in [10], in usual implementations one
exponentiation in GT costs about 4 scalar multiplications in
G1. This means that we can transform all exponentiations in
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF THE TAA SCHEME
Party Computational cost†
Join Issuer 6 ·G1 + verPK
Signer 3 ·G1 + 4 · P + sigSK
Sign Signer v1: 6 ·G1 + 1 · P
v2: 9 ·G1 + 1 · P
Verify Verifier v1: 5 ·G1 + 5 · P
v2: 8 ·G1 + 5 · P
Link Verifier verify two signatures
Trace Verifier v2: verify two signatures
+1 ·G1
Disavow Signer sign a message
Verifier link or trace two signatures
† Here, n ·G1 denotes n scalar multiplications, m · P denotes m
pairing operations, and all required exponentiations in GT have
been transformed into scalar multiplications in G1, while v1 and v2
refer to the two versions of the proposed TAA scheme.
GT required in our TAA scheme into scalar multiplications in
G1 to get a faster implementation. For example, to calculate
tˆ(S,X)x in the Sign algorithm we can first compute x · S
and then get the value of tˆ(S,X)x by computing tˆ(x · S,X).
This trick also applies to the Verify algorithm. The numbers
given in Table I reflect the results after this transformation. In
addition, we will discuss the cost of checking the rogue list
in Table III, rather than list it in this table. We also remark
that the ThresholdCheck algorithm is not considered here as
its main job is to validate and link a number of signatures and
it does not require any expensive operation.
In Table I, n · G1 denotes n scalar multiplications in G1,
and m · P means m pairing operations. Note that in the Join
protocol, the signer also needs to sign her commitment F
using a standard signature, which is denoted by sigSK, while
the issuer will verify this signature, denoted by verPK . Here,
v1 and v2 refer to the two versions of the proposed TAA
scheme. In the Trace algorithm, as both L†0 and L
†
1 have
been calculated during the process of signature verification,
we assume they are available for the Trace algorithm. So, for
the Link and Trace algorithms there are almost no extra costs
except the necessary overheads to verify the two signatures.
The Disavow protocol is also very simple.
A. Performance comparison with other schemes
In this section, we compare our TAA scheme with the two
most relevant schemes, Hybrid [8] and GSIS [15]. Specifically,
we conduct our comparison in three categories: functionalities,
message and signature sizes, and computation time.
Functionalities. In Table II, we compare the schemes
by considering the three main functionalities of reliability,
privacy, and auditability. These are further divided into eight
security requirements as discussed in Section I. Entity authen-
tication and data integrity are satisfied in all proposals, as
secure digital signatures are used to sign messages. However,
only our TAA scheme provides flexible threshold verification,
as neither GSIS nor Hybrid provides distinguishability of
origin. Anonymity and revocation are also achieved by all
schemes, as some kind of group signature techniques are
used. However, Hybrid can only partially provide unlinkability
(marked by a ‘half tick’ \ in Table II), as discussed in Section
II. Apart from our TAA scheme version 1, all solutions satisfy
the traceability property. Finally, neither Hybrid nor GSIS can
achieve non-repudiation, as the issuer also holds the group
signing key of a vehicle. In our TAA scheme, as in the
DAA scheme proposed in [10], the issuer does not know
the most important piece of the signing key: the secret f .
Consequently, our scheme (both versions) satisfies the non-
repudiation requirement.
In the following, we shall mainly compare our TAA scheme
to GSIS as their structures are much closer than that of Hybrid.
Message and signature sizes. In GSIS [15], the size of a
group signature σ is |σ| = 3|G1|+ 6|q|. In our scheme TAA
v1, |σ| = 5|G1| + 3|q|, and in v2, |σ| = 7|G1| + 3|q|. To
achieve 80-bit security level, approximately the same level as
a standard 1024-bit RSA signature, we can use the elliptic
curves suggested in [20] by picking a 160-bit prime q and a
group G1 where each element is 161 bits. So, the signatures
sizes in GSIS and two versions of our TAA scheme are 1443
bits (or 181 bytes), 1285 bits (or 160 bytes) and 1607 bits
(or 201 bytes), respectively. Hence we conclude that our TAA
scheme has similar signature size as GSIS. The signature size
in Hybrid is also about 200 bytes. According to the simulation
results given in [8], [15], the signature sizes of both versions
of our TAA scheme are suitable for VANETs.
Computation time. According to the implementation re-
sults given in [20], to achieve 80-bit security level we can
set |q| = 160 and |G1| = 161, and select appropriate curves,
so that one multiplication in G1 and one pairing evaluation
can be done within 0.6 ms and 4.5 ms, respectively. Those
results were obtained from running an Intel Pentinum IV 3.0
GHZ machine, which has similar performance as the CVIS
vehicle machine developed for the future communications in
VANETs ([1]). Then, according to the performance analysis
given in Table I and similar analysis on GSIS ([15]), we get
Table III showing the comparison of computation times (n
denotes the size of the revocation list).
From Table III, we can see that signing a message in both
versions of our TAA scheme takes almost the same time as in
GSIS, while the time for verifying a signature in our scheme
is approximately doubled. The main reason for this is that
a few pairing evaluations in GSIS can be pre-computed, but
this is not possible in our TAA scheme. On the other hand,
revocation check in our scheme is significantly faster than in
GSIS, since for each entry in the rogue list (or revocation list),
our scheme needs to perform one only scalar multiplication
in G1 but GSIS has to evaluate three pairings. In practice,
signature verification always involves revocation check, so
the overhead for validating a signature in our TAA scheme
is always less than in GSIS if the revocation list is not empty,
i.e., n ≥ 1. By assuming two signatures have been verified
(the usual case in practice), our Link algorithm has no other
overhead except checking whether two strings are the same.
To run the Disavow protocol, one new signature on the same
message should be generated and verified.
From the above comparison results, we can conclude that
our TAA scheme maintains similar performance to the existing




Auth. Integ. Threshold. Anonym. Unlink. Trace. Revoc. Non-repud.
Hybrid [8]   x  \   x
GSIS [15]   x     x
Our TAA v1      x  
Our TAA v2        
Auth.: entity authentication; Integ.: data integrity; Threshold.: threshold verification; Anonym.: anonymity; Unlink.: unlinkability; Trace.:
traceability; Revoc.: revocation; Non-repud.: non-repudiation.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION TIME (IN MS)
Sign Verify Revocation check‡ Link Trace Disavowal
GSIS [15] 7.5 13.8 13.5×n – 1.2 –
Our TAA v1 8.1 25.5 0.6×n 0 – 33.1
Our TAA v2 9.9 27.3 0.6×n 0 0.6 37.8
‡ n used in the 4th column denotes the length of the revocation list.
solutions of [8], [15], while providing the additional features
of flexible threshold verification, a higher level of user privacy,
and non-repudiation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel Threshold Anonymous An-
nouncement scheme for VANET communication based on di-
rect anonymous attestation and one-time anonymous authenti-
cation. Our scheme resolves the issues of non-repudiation and
distinguishability of origin which were previously unresolved
in the schemes of [15] and [8], thereby enabling a reliable and
auditable TAA service while preserving user privacy against
both authorised parties and adversaries.
One important criteria in assessing TAA schemes is per-
formance. A good balance between hardware and software
should be considered. In trusted computing technology, we
consider a cheap TPM and a powerful platform. In VANETs,
where computation and storage may be substantial, and where
communication characteristics may differ according to appli-
cations, the type of platform used would have some influence
on the type of schemes that can be implemented. Further work
on evaluation criteria to better assess present schemes would
also be useful. Other aspects of TAA schemes that has yet
to be fully investigated include the possiblity of incorporating
roadside infrastructure to improve the efficiency of tracing and
revocation. This will also require a careful study of security
assumptions made on this infrastructure. Another challenge
for future work is to explore the formal definitions of the rich
and diverse security properties desired in VANETs and give
rigorous proofs to the security of the proposed TAA scheme.
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